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NOTES
TE NEED FOR CREATIVE ORDERS UNDER SECTION
10(c) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act' empowers the
National Labor Relations Board 2 to order a party guilty of an unfair labor
practice "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies
of this Act." 3 This broad power appears sufficient to meet any contin-
gency; yet even those closest to the Board's operations lament the inefficacy
of many orders 4 Although the legislative history of the NLRA contains
little discussion of the scope of the Board's order-making power,5 Congress
regarded the ability of the Board to make and enforce effective decisions a
vital feature of the Act.6
1 If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the' Board shall be of
the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its
findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and
to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the Act.
49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958) [hereinafter cited as the
NLRA or the Act].
2 Hereinafter referred to as the NLRB or the Board.
3 Although this Note concerns the scope of the Board's section 10(c) power, the
Board may also under section 10(j) of the Act seek injunctions to preserve the status
quo until completion of an NLRB hearing. 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j)
(1958). The successful employment of the section 10(j) injunction could alleviate
many problems discussed in this Note. Because of the district courts' reluctance to
grant injunctions, however, section 10(c) orders remain the NLRB's primary weapon.
4 See Address by Chairman McCulloch, Federal Bar Association Convention, in
30 U.S.L. WEEK 2133, 2134 (Sept. 19, 1961) ; SuBcoMM. oN NLRB, HousE Commz.
oN EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT BY THE NLRB 2 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter
cited as PuCINSKI REPORT].
5 The debate primarily concerned the Act's general philosophy and the breadth
of its proscriptions. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 9704 (1935) (remarks of Representative
Ekwall). However, there was some discussion of the Board's 10(c) power:
The orders will of course be adapted to the needs of the individual case;
they may include such matters as refraining from collective bargaining with
a minority group, recognition of the agency chosen by the majority for the
purposes of collective bargaining, posting of appropriate bulletins, refraining
from bargaining with an organization corrupted by unfair labor practices.
The most frequent form of affirmative action required in cases of this type is
specifically provided for, i.e., the reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as the circumstances dictate.
H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1935).
"The power of this board to issue orders is strictly limited to the preservation
of the industrial freedom guaranteed specifically by the bill." 79 CONG. REc. 6184
(1935) (speech of Senator Wagner read into the Record).
0 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935); 79 CONG. REc. 9699
(1935) (remarks of Representative Marcantonio) ; 79 CONG. REc. 9683 (1935) (re-
marks of Representative Connery).
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The congressional determination to draft section 10(c) in indefinite
language rather than to formulate preordained penalties for each offense
allows the Board to set the tenor of its own authority by imaginative and
specific treatment of the unique circumstances surrounding each unfair
practice.7 The federal courts of appeals are to apply a final corrective and
directive influence in their review of Board orders.8 The Board, however,
has not always fulfilled its responsibility to make orders that both fit the
needs of the particular parties and foster the Act's public policy of preserv-
ing industrial peace. Although the heavy workload of the NLRB makes
standard orders for similar cases inevitable, the Board at times inflexibly
applies the same standard order to distinguishable situations, regardless
of the unsuitability of the order in the actual context.
Industrial Fabricating, Inc.9 illustrates this mechanical approach. To
avoid unionization, an employer moved its plant to another state. The
Board issued its standard order that the employer offer the discharged
workers jobs in the new plant, but the very opinion that announced the
order admitted that few employees would accept the offer to move.',
In NLRB v. Kingston Cake Co.," a union officer attempted to dis-
qualify his union from the Act's protection ' 2 and to influence its members
to join another union in which the officer also had an interest. The first
union removed the officer from his union position and induced the employer
to violate the NLRA by discharging the officer from his job. The NLRB
automatically ordered the officer's reinstatement; yet, the Board's order
served only the discharged worker and ignored the public interest that the
Board not indirectly condone his activity, which tended to destroy employee
free choice.' 3 Reinstatement also might have caused additional interruption
to commerce by disgruntling the other employees.' 4 The NLRB could have
given more coordinated effect to the Act if it merely had compelled the
employer to pay the worker until he obtained substantially equivalent
employment.
Rather than grapple with the facts of these cases to devise orders that
accommodated all relevant policies of the Act, the Board simply applied its
preestablished remedy. In other instances the Board has exhibited a similar
weakness by issuing excessively broad orders.15 More fundamentally, the
7 Cf. Note, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 776, 794 (1936).
8 See 79 CoNG. REc. 6184 (1935) (speech of Senator Wagner read into the
Record).
9 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184
(6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
Ao 119 N.L.R.B. at 173-74.
1191 N.L.R.B. 447 (1950), enforcement denied, 206 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1953).
12 91 N.L.R.B. at 460 (Trial Examiner's Report).
13 206 F.2d at 610.
14 Cf. id. at 608.
15 See, e.g., Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960) (per
curiam) ; NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 283 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1960), rev'd
on other grounds, 368 U.S. 318 (1961).
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Board rarely utilizes its full authority under section 10(c) to require a
guilty party to perform whatever action is necessary to rectify an unfair
practice. This authority includes the power to order guilty parties to
perform acts not required by the NLRA of law-abiding parties or to refrain
from activity that is itself nonviolative.16 Reviewing courts frequently
share responsibility with the Board for this lack of creativity by not recog-
nizing the full scope of the 10(c) power in Congress' statutory scheme.
I. THE LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF SECTION 10(C)
Throughout the congressional debates sponsors of the NLRA em-
phasized that the Act did not confer any unique power on the NLRB.17
Although the congressional leaders properly compared the Board with
existing institutions, examination of these institutions also reveals distinc-
tive features of the NLRB and emphasizes section 10(c)'s role in the Act.
A. The Federal Trade Commission 18
The 1914 Congress intended the FTC " to be a flexible, specialized
antitrust enforcement agency.20 The FTC was not an inferior court bound
to settle all differences between private litigants, but was to act only against
practices harmful to the public generally.21 To ensure flexibility, Congress
broadly commissioned the FTC to prevent "unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce," 
22
but these terms were defined neither in the act 23 nor in the legislative
history.2 4 Although Congress probably did not intend to limit the FTC's
power to deal with unfair practices, it authorized the Commission to issue
only "cease and desist" orders 2 5 and not to grant affirmative relief.
The frequent comparisons of the proposed NLRB with the FTC 26
should have disturbed supporters of strong labor legislation, since by 1935
16 See text accompanying notes 104-15 infra.
17 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935) ; 79 CONG. REc. 8538
(1935) (remarks of Representative Connery) ; 79 CONG. REc. 7569 (1935) (remarks
of Senator Wagner). See also, Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon
the Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1089 (1937).
18 Hereinafter referred to as the FTC or the Commission.
19 Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1958) [hereinafter cited as FTCA].
20 See JAFFE & NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 168-69 (2d ed. 1961); cf.
S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1914).
21 See FTCA § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958);
FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1931) ; FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25-26
(1929) ; Note, 62 CoLum. L. REV. 671, 686 (1962).
22 FTCA § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958).
See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, Ixc., LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT 147 (1935).
23 See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 306 (1963)
(dictum) ; S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
24 See Herring, Politics, Personalities and the Federal Trade Commission, 28
Am. POL. Sc. REv. 1016, 1017 (1934).
25FTCA § 5, 38 Stat 720 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45(b)-(c) (1958).
26 See, e.g., S. REP'. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935); H.R. REP'. No. 969,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935).
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the FTC had proven singularly unsuccessful. 21  The indefinite scope of the
agency's power, disagreement on the meaning of "unfair methods of com-
petition," the agency's own uncertainty of purpose, chronic turnover of
staff members, and political pressures all contributed to general ineffective-
ness? 8 The chief factor in the FTC's early failure, however, was judicial
hostility. Despite occasional expressions of confidence in the Commission,29
the Supreme Court, apparently oblivious to FTC expertise,3 0 generally
construed the act restrictively 3 ' and stressed the importance of judicial
review of administrative action.m 3 2 A further limit to the FTC's power was
the Court's literal reading of the order-making section to imply that the
FTC could frame only negative orders.33 Although the Commission could
draft most orders to meet this requirement, the suggestion that the courts
might require such verbal legerdemain illustrates their highly restrictive
construction of the act.
The NLRA mirrors congressional awareness of the FTCA's short-
comings. While Congress nominally adhered to the FTC prototype, it
followed the model selectively, making departures to increase administrative
effectiveness and to ensure judicial cooperation. Specifically, Congress
copied the FTCA when it made the NLRB a specialized administrative
agency,3 4 when it directed the Board to protect primarily the "public in-
2 7 At the time of the debates on the NLRA, the FTC was an ineffectual and
maligned body. E.g., "Judge Hough . . . said in effect: '. . . When I have before
me a case to review of the Federal Trade Commission, almost instinctively I want
to reverse it.'" Frankfurter, Summation of the Conference, 24 A.B.A.J. 282, 285
(1938). "[M]y own view is that so far as the useful functions of the Trade Com-
mission are concerned the Trade Commission is suffering from pernicious anemia
. " 67 CONG. Rc. 3630 (1926) (remarks of Representative Connally). "Its
chief function today is 'preventing false and misleading advertising in reference to
hair restorers, anti-fat remedies, etc.-a somewhat inglorious end to a noble experi-
ment.'" Abram F. Myers, quoted in Herring, supra note 24, at 1021; cf. Note, 62
COLUm. L. REv. 671, 673 (1962) ; JAFFE & NATHANSON, op. Cit. supra note 20, at 170.
28 See Herring, supra note 24, at 1020-28.
29 See, e.g., FTC v. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) ; FTC v. Pacific
States Paper Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 63 (1927).
30 Cf. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931) ; FTC v. Beech-Nut Pack-
ing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455-56 (1922).
3' See, e.g., FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) ; Simpson, Fifty Years of Alneri-
can Equity, 50 HAgv. L. Rxv. 171, 185 (1936).
2See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1931); FTC v.
Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1920). The Supreme Court is no longer hostile to the
FTC. See, e.g., FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957); FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1948). Indeed, critics now claim that the Court
places too much trust in the Commission. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising
Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 403-06 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; Note, 62 COLUM.
L. REv. 671, 680 (1962).
33 See FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 624-25 (1927); Id. at 627
(Stone, J., dissenting).
34 See H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1935) ; 79 CONG. REc. 9724
(1935) (remarks of Representative Marcantonio). But see JAFFE & NATHANSON,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 148-49, who suggest that the creation of an administrative
agency was merely to sidetrack an unwilling judiciary that would have frustrated any
attempt to confer private rights. This theory overlooks the effective frustration of
the FTC by the courts at the time the NLRA was passed and the continual references
to the "public interest" in the debates.
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terest," 35 and when it left the issuance of all complaints to the Board's
controlled discretion3 6 However, forewarned by the restrictive judicial
treatment of the FTC's seemingly broad authority to prevent "unfair
methods of competition," 37 Congress delimited the courts' supervisory
power by permitting the NLRB only to consider five carefully drafted unfair
labor practices.38 Thus, disagreements between the agency and the review-
ing courts would, at least, be confined to interpretation and application of
the same unfair practices.
Congress also varied the FTCA scheme by allowing the NLRB to
require "affirmative action" and not merely to issue "cease and desist"
orders. Notwithstanding the practical identity of these two authorizations
today,3 9 in 1935 the modified wording in the NLRA clearly directed the
NLRB to act flexibly. Moreover, the only order specifically mentioned
in section 10(c), reinstatement with or without back pay,40 stressed the
expanded discretion of the new agency not only to prevent future unfair
practices 4 1 but also to rectify the effects of violations already committed. 42
Since an order depends on many complex factors 4 3 --the sole statutory
limitation being to effectuate the policies of the Act-, Congress must have
intended the courts to defer more readily to the Board's 10(c) orders
than to its findings of legislatively defined unfair practices.
B. The Railway Labor Acts
After continual experimentation with railroad labor problems since
18884 Congress by 1935 had established the National Railroad Adjust-
35 See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1147,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935) ; 79 CONG. REc. 9683 (1935) (remarks of Representa-
tive Greenwood) ; Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S.
261, 263 (1940).
80 FTCA § 10(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958).
3 7 During the NLRA debates, congressional criticism of the judicial treatment
of the FTC was surprisingly mild. See H.R. REP. No. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1935).
38 FTCA § 8, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958) ; S. REP. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935) ; 79 CONG. REc. 9711 (1935) (remarks of Representa-
tive Welch) ; 79 CONG. REc. 8538 (1935) (remarks of Representative Connery).
39 The Court has not followed the distinction between negative and affirmative
orders implied in FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 624-25 (1927). It
now emphasizes the experience and specialization of the Commission in formulating
orders. See FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 392 (1959); Moog Industries v.
FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958) (per curiam).
40 See note 1 supra.
41The FTC focuses on preventing future wrongful conduct. See FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
42See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1935) ; 2 N.L.R.B. ANN.
REP. 144 (1937).
43 See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-49 (1953); Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
44 Act of Oct 1, 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501 (voluntary arbitration, temporary
commissions of investigation) ; Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (government
mediation at the request of the parties, specific practices proscribed), see Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) ; Act of July 15, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (perma-
nent Board of Mediation and Conciliation, but no mandatory government interven-
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ment Board to handle grievance disputes and to conduct elections for bar-
gaining representatives 4r and the National Mediation Board to intercede
in collective bargaining disagreements at the invitation of the carrier or
employees.46 One of the purposes of the Railway Labor Act was to avoid
"interruption of commerce" by "forbid[ding] any limitation upon freedom
of association among employees." 47 The act detailed the proscribed unfair
labor practices,48 provided criminal penalties for disobedience,49 and au-
thorized United States Attorneys to bring suit for willful noncompliance
upon receipt of a complaint from the "duly designated representative of a
carrier's employees." 50
Realizing that the existing strength of railroad unions and the public
interest in efficient railroad operation placed the railroads in a unique posi-
tion in the economy, 51 Congress in 1935 was unwilling to intrude upon
general labor problems as extensively as it had in the railroad regulatory
scheme. In the NLRA, Congress did not affirmatively attempt to produce
agreements,52 but limited itself to removing pressures opposed to organiza-
tion and the procedure of collective bargaining.53 Congress did, however,
follow the Railway Labor Act's stated purpose to prevent interruptions of
commerce by protecting labor's right to organize. It also enumerated
proscribed practices and relied on public officials rather than interested
parties to enforce the Act. Nevertheless, Congress established a specialized,
flexible administrative agency as the forum for applying the NLRA to
avoid the risk of inaction by a precedent-bound judiciary.7 Moreover,
tion) ; Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, §§ 302-08, 41 Stat. 456 (no proscribed prac-
tices, but a Railroad Labor Board to hear disputes without statutory sanctions), see
Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. & Allied Lines Fed'n No. 90 v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S.
203, 217 (1925); Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 1, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 151 (1958) (Board of Mediation established specific practices proscribed),
see Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568-69
(1930). The federal government in control of railroads during World War I pro-
hibited, in its managerial capacity, employer discrimination against union membership.
See LEcHT, EXPERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION 31-32 (1955).
4548 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1958).
4648 Stat 1193 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
47 48 Stat 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151a(1)-(2) (1958).
4
8 The carrier could not deny or question the right of workers to unionize, nor
collect dues for the union, nor give financial assistance to the union. 48 Stat. 1187
(1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1958). The act also prohibited "yellow
dog" contracts. 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fifth (1958).
49 Each offense was a misdemeanor with fine, imprisonment, or both. 48 Stat.
1189 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth (1958).
5048 Stat. 1189 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth (1958).
5 1 TWENIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., op. cit. supra note 22, at 193; Magruder,
supra note 17, at 1111-12.
52 See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935); 79 CONG. REC. 9711
(1935) (remarks of Representative Welch); 79 CONG. REc. 9709 (1935) (remarks
of Representative Wood).
53 See S. REP. No. 573, supra note 52, at 18.
5 4 The courts had granted affirmative relief under the Railway Labor Act. See
Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 557 (1930).
However, the Supreme Court has admitted that although the public interest required
this kind of relief, it was traditionally refused by equity courts in private litigation.
See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, AFL, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
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while the Railway Labor Act provided criminal penalties for disobedience,
the omission of these penalties from the NLRA left the entire responsibility
for effective enforcement to the Board's ingenuity in formulating its
orders.05
C. The National Industrial Recovery Act
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 5 -- the direct
antecedent of the NLRA 57-guaranteed the workers' right to organize.
Congress later authorized the President to establish a board to investigate,
without subpoena power, controversies under section 7(a) and to conduct
elections for bargaining representatives. 58 The original National Labor
Relations Board was more a moral force 59 than an effective instrument
of regulation, because its only sanctions were referrals either to the com-
pliance division of the National Recovery Administration for removal of
the "Blue Eagle" or to the Department of Justice for criminal action-a
procedure which required a trial de novo.60 Despite its reliance on volun-
tary compliance, the original NLRB often issued imaginative recommenda-
tions to rectify discriminatory practices.0 1
In the NLRA Congress retained the concept of an administrative
agency dealing solely with labor problems. The new agency was to issue
orders similar to those of the original NLRB, 2 but it could seek direct
enforcement from the federal courts. Moreover, to concentrate respon-
sibility in one body, Congress eliminated the cumbersome lower trial
boards-the industrial, regional, and special boards-, which had hampered
a cohesive interpretation of the NIRA's section 7(a).3
D. Treatment of Section 10(c) in the Labor Management Relations Act
Twelve years after the NLRA's enactment, Congress significantly
amended it by the Labor Management Relations Act.64 Section 10(c)
55 See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
56 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 198 (1933) [herein-
after cited as the NIRA].
57 See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1935); 79 CONG. REc. 9683
(1935) (remarks of Representative Connery).
58 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 677, 48 Stat. 1183.
59 Exec. Order No. 6763 (June 29, 1934), Decisions of N.L.R.B., July-Dec. 1934,
vii, created the NLRB pursuant to 48 Stat. 1183 (1934). The President directed the
Board to recommend rules and regulations for collective bargaining, labor representa-
tion, and labor elections; to provide arbitration boards for unions and employers;
and to recommend the establishment of regional and special labor boards and review
their decisions. See Note, 3 GEo. WASH. L. Rzv. 51, 53 (1934).
60 See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., op. cit. upra note 22, at 212; Note, 3
GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 51, 57 (1934).
61 See Chicago Defender, Inc., Decisions of N.L.R.B., July-Dec. 1934, No. 126,
at 119 (1934) ; Houde Engineering Corp., Decisions of N.L.R.B., July-Dec. 1934, No.
12, at 35, 39 (1934) ; H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935).
62 79 CONG. REc. 9683 (1935) (remarks of Representative Connery) ; cf. TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., op. cit. supra note 22, at 8.
63 See S. RaP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1935).
64 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958) (Taft-Hartley Act)
[hereinafter cited as the LMRA].
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emerged substantially unchanged 65 after surviving an attack aimed at
restricting NLR.B flexibility. The House version of the LMRA created
an independent administrator, whose duties included investigating unfair
practice charges and issuing complaints when he had reasonable cause to
believe the charges.6 6  The amendment would have limited the Board's 17
functions to adjudicating complaints issued by the administrator.68  Under
the House bill, once the Board found an unfair practice it could only order
the guilty party "to take such affirmative action requested in the com-
plaint . . as will effectuate the policies of [the] Act." 69 The require-
ment that the type of relief be determined by an independent administrator
before the facts were fully developed at the hearing would have sharply
diminished the Board's discretion to deal with unfair practices. 70 The
defeat of the House amendment stressed the importance of the NLRB's
initial discretion under section 10(c).71
E. Criteria for 10(c) Orders Derived From the Statutory Context
1. Primacy of the Public Interest
The basic policy statement introducing the NLRA7 2 stresses that
the NLRB is a public agency enforcing public rights.73 Congress attempted
65 NLRA § 10, 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958). The amendment gave the Board the same power over
unions as it already had over employers, forbade the Board to discriminate between
independent and affiliated unions, and prohibited the Board to reinstate an individual
suspended or discharged for cause. The debates concerned only discharges which
themselves were alleged unfair labor practices. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 42 (1947) ; 93 CoNG. REc. 7529 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball) ; 93 CONG.
REc. 6518 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). Congress did not consider whether
an employee discharged for cause could be reinstated to remedy another unfair practice.
Cf. Coats & Clark, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 237 (1955), modified, 241 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.
1957) ; notes 182-84, infra, and accompanying text.
66 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1947).
67 The House bill also replaced the NLRB with a Labor Management Relations
Board, because the old Board decided cases according to "prejudice and caprice."
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1947) ; H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1947).
68 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(a) (1947).
69 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(c) (1947). (Emphasis added.)
70 See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1947) (minority report).
71 However, Congress also indicated that the reviewing courts should increase
their exercise of independent judgment in reviewing NLRB decisions. The NLRA
provided, "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall
be conclusive." 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958). The
LMRA amended the section to read, "The findings of the Board with respect to ques-
tions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole
shall be conclusive." 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958). Although
the amendment concerns the review of facts underlying a finding of an unfair practice,
the legislation expressed a congressional mood generally critical of automatic deference
to the Board's expertise. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1947) ;
H.R. RaP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1947) (conference report). But see
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
72 NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
73 See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1935); NLRB v. Fant
Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1959) ; NLRB v. -Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 137
(2d Cir. 1960) ; Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National
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to free commerce from strife among employees, unions, and management
by the elimination of threshold skirmishes that block peaceful labor-
management relations. The procedural structure of the NLRA reflects this
public orientation. Even though the NLRB cannot act until a private
party files a charge, 74 the General Counsel, rather than the parties con-
cerned, must pursue complaints, 75 direct the actual inquiry, and frame the
ultimate issues in a case.76 The NLRB, however, may not impose its own
notions of "public interest" on management and labor, since it may only
direct parties to conform with the principles of the Act.77  Although the
NLRB cannot overlook the private interests affected,78 the conduct it orders
is only a means to the real goal of industrial peace.79
The NLRA's public aspects, recognized in the abstract, often are
submerged in the daily operations of the NLRB 80 and the courts.81 Two
Supreme Court decisions tend to restrict the NLRB to the adjudication
of private rights. Nathanson v. NLRB, 82 construing the Bankruptcy
Act,83 denied that an NLRB back pay award against a bankrupt employer
was a debt to the United States. The Court characterized the NLRB as
an "agent for the injured employees," collecting for the benefit of private
persons.84 The implication of this language, if applied to the NLRB's
Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. Rzv. 389, 426 (1950) ; Note, 89 U. PA. L. REv.
648, 650 (1941) ; cf. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 HIv. L. Rv. 274, 281 (1948). A theory that employers and employees
have duties under the Act but only the public has rights was approached in Eastern
Coal Corp. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 131, 136-37 (4th Cir. 1949); Stewart Die Casting
Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801, 804 (7th Cir. 1942). The usual approach is that the
Board asserts the rights both of the aggrieved party and of the public. NLRB v.
Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 279 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1960).
74 NLRA § 10(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958);
Fuchs, Fairness and Effectiveness in Administrative Agency Organization and Pro-
cedures, 36 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (1960).
75 NLRA § 3(d), added by 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)
(1958).
76 See NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307 (1959). Once a charge has
been filed, even a subsequent private settlement cannot deprive the Board of juris-
diction. NLRA § 10(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958);
3 NLRB ANN. REP. 213 (1938).
77 See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940).
78 See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946); Pederson v.
NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956).
79 Although the individual's right to organize and bargain collectively was pre-
viously recognized, Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S.
261, 263-64 (1940), citing American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council,
257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921), the NLRA stressed the public interest in protecting these
rights.80 See, e.g., Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174, 176 (1957)
(primary purpose of Act to protect employers and employees).
81 See, e.g., NLRB v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1957); NLRB
v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1955) ; NLRB v.
Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co., 199 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1952).
82 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
83 Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104
(a) (5) (Supp. IV, 1963).
84 Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1952) (dictum). Commentators
routinely accepted the Court's language. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1952 Termn,
67 HAav. L. REv. 91, 163-64 (1953) ; 51 MicH. L. REv. 914 (1953).
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function in enforcing its orders generally, is that evasion of NLRB orders
does not oppose the public interest.
The breadth of the Supreme Court's language in Nathanson influenced
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Deena Artware,
[nc.,8 5 a case involving the NLRA and not a collateral statute. The NLRB
had moved for discovery of corporate records to determine whether the
corporation manipulated funds to make itself unable to honor a back pay
award. Dismissing the NLRB's motion, the court ignored harm to the
public interest caused by the evasion of NLRB orders and held that back
pay awards, like any unpaid wage claim, were for the benefit of private
persons only.86 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on an-
other issue,8 7 but apparently accepted the lower court's description of the
NLRB as a statutory representative of employees.88 This characterization
ignores the public policy statements and procedural design of the NLRA.
2. Maintenance of Perspective
An agency specializing in a limited area may not only tend to disregard
extrinsic policies,89 but also may have difficulty in coordinating the various
policies of the act it administers.90 Sometimes the NLRB's attempt to
rectify an unfair labor practice may undermine other, equally important
policies of the Act. Thus, despite the interest in deterring employers from
giving, and unions from accepting, illegal assistance to defeat another union,
a Board order that precludes the workers from ever freely choosing the
aided union overlooks the very reason for the proscription of employer
activity on behalf of a union: the preservation of employee free choice.91
Similarly, if the NLRB, finding that a company has financially supported
an incumbent union, orders the company to disregard its collective agree-
ment with the union, the order may nullify the employer's illegal assistance,
but it will also abrogate existing wages, hours, and working conditions, and
may disrupt the industrial stability that the NLRA seeks to foster.92 Like-
wise, if during an unfair labor practice strike unidentified strikers instigate
violence on the picket line, denial of reinstatement and back pay to all
strikers who continue to picket may deter picket line violence. But, more
85251 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 398 (1960).
86 251 F.2d at 186-87.
87 361 U.S. 398 (1960).
88 See id. at 411-12 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
89 See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46-48 (1942) (Board order
found to encourage mutiny) ; NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240,
253 (1939) (Board order found to encourage violence); Kramer, The Place and
Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 1, 4
(1959).
10 See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953).
91 See NLRB v. District 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453, 461-63 (1958).
92 See Consolidated Edison Co., v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938) ; NLRB
v. Kiekhaefer Corp., 292 F.2d 130, 135-37 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Scullin Steel
Co., 161 F.2d 143, 147-48 (8th Cir. 1947).
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importantly, the order impairs the right to strike 9 3 guaranteed by the Act.,
Although accommodation of every relevant policy is often impractical, the
Board should explore the ramifications of alternative potential orders in
pursuit of this goal.
3. Flexibility and Precision in Board Orders
Both the legislative history 95 and the language 96 of section 10(c)
show Congress' reliance on the NLRB's discretion. The NLRB's flexi-
bility has been compared with that of a chancellor in equity,97 but Board
orders must be even more imaginative and meticulous. 98 Although the
application of similar orders to similar factual situations increases both
the efficiency and evenhandedness of the NLRB's processes, the NLRB
should use preordained formulas only if they adequately safeguard the
rights guaranteed by the Act in the precise context.
The NLRB should similarly avoid sweeping orders that do not
specifically protect against the unfair practice actually committed. Orders
forbidding violations against the charging party "or any other party," 99
or those forbidding interference in the manner charged in the complaint
"Cor in any other manner," "O may be allowable to remedy a generalized
pattern of conduct in violation of the Act,Ol but they often reflect lack of
close analysis by the Board.10 2  Moreover, broad orders that merely require
the offending party to obey the Act in the future may be a delegation by
the Board of its responsibility to prevent unfair practices, since the courts
must then try in contempt proceedings future violations unrelated to the
original unfair practice.103
93 See International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 237 F.2d 545
(D.C. Cir. 1956), modifying B. V. D. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1412 (1954); Ratner, iPolicy
Making by the New "Qiuasi-Judicial" NLRB, 23 U. CHL L. REv. 12, 23-24 (1955).
94 NLRA § 13, 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
9 5 See text accompanying notes 39-43, 55 supra.
96 See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
97 See NLRB v. American Dredging Co., 276 F.2d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 914, 918
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961).
98 The Board must effectively enforce duties like good faith bargaining which
equity courts would hesitate to direct. Cf. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY
120 (4th ed. 1956); Elliott, Specific Performance, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 72, 74; Pound,
The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919: Equity, 33 HARv. L. REV. 420, 421 (1920).
09 E.g., NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 276 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Local 926, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs, 267 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir.
1959).
100 E.g., NLRB v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 314 F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1963)
(per curiam) ; Bon-R Reproductions, Inc. v. NLRB, 309 F.2d 898, 905 (2d Cir.
1962); NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807, 810-11 (7th Cir.
1962).
101 Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479, 481 (1960) (per curiam)
(by implication).
102 Cf. NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 283 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1960), revd
on other grounds, 368 U.S. 318 (1961).
103 See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435 (1941).
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4. Creativity in Framing Orders
Court enforcement of broad orders in several instances 104 has indicated
that the Board has authority to draft orders which go beyond minimal
correction of the actual wrong committed, provided the orders reasonably
relate to that wrong.10 5 The NLRB should avoid using this authority to
draw standard negative orders with broad strokes, but instead should more
frequently draft orders which require those guilty of unfair practices to
perform or avoid specific conduct,10 6 even though the Act does not demand
such compliance of law-abiding parties. Obviously the NLRB's power is
limited; its orders must be "functions of the purpose to be accom-
plished" 10 7-- restoration of the situation antedating the unfair practice and
assurance of future compliance with the Act.
NLRB v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc.0 8 illustrates a specifically drawn
negative order requiring an employer to refrain from conduct which he
otherwise might have performed without violating the act. The NLRB
ordered the employer to cease questioning employees about union activity
despite the absence of previous illegal interrogations, since the workers'
knowledge of the employer's other anti-union tactics might have made even
privileged interrogations seem coercive.10 9
The NLRB in I. J. Hagerty, Inc."0 again fully utilized its section
10(c) power. A union hiring hall had previously been subject to three
separate charges of discrimination.-" Although law-abiding unions are
largely unrestricted in the types of hiring halls they may devise, the Board
directed this union to formulate a nondiscriminatory hiring and referral
system under the supervision of the Regional Director. 11 2  Only upon the
304 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705-06
(1951); Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 529, 532 (3d Cir.
1962).
1o5 NLRB v. Firedoor Corp. of America, 291 F.2d 328, 332 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961). See May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 391-93
(1945).
106 However, the Board should avoid orders so detailed that they can be circum-
vented by mere formal compliance. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705-06 (1951); McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S.
187, 192-93 (1949).
107 NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953).
108298 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1962).
109 Id. at 898-99; accord, NLRB v. Firedoor Corp. of America, 291 F.2d 328,
331 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961). But cf. NLRB v. Threads, Inc.,
308 F.2d 1, 11 (4th Cir. 1962).
110 139 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 51 L.R.R.M. 1349 (1962), mnodified sub nora. Local 138,-
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 4 CCH LAE. REL. REP. (47 CCH Lab. Cas.) 1 18352
(2d Cir. July 8, 1963).
111 See Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957); A.
Cestone Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 669 (1957), enforced, 254 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1958) (memo-
randum decision) ; Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 123 N.L.R.B. 1393
(1959), modified, 293 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1961).
112 The Board also directed the union to keep permanent records of the system
available for inspection and file quarterly reports about specific workers. In addition,
the Board directed the Regional Director to inspect the hall periodically. J. J. Hagerty,
Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 51 L.R.R.M. 1349, 1354-55 (1962), mnodified sub nora.
Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating. Eng'rs, 4 CCH LAB. REL. REP. (47 CCH Lab.
Cas.) 1f 18352 (2d Cir. July 8, 1963).
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Director's approval of a plan could the union bargain with employers on its
incorporation into collective agreements. Since the order suggested no
particular plan, it did not preclude alterations to meet employer suggestions,
provided the Regional Director agreed to the changes; nor did the order
prevent the union from ceasing altogether its activities as a hiring agent.
The order did, however, ensure future compliance with the Act by tem-
porarily limiting the flexibility of a union that had repeatedly violated the
law.
5. Clear Explanation of an Order's Function
Even after close analysis of facts and careful balancing of all relevant
policies, the NLRB risks reversal by the reviewing court unless it explains
how its order effectuates the policies of the Act. Since a court of appeals,
accustomed to one order consistently issued for a given unfair practice,
may reverse a unique order not obviously appropriate, 113 the NLRB should
note the aspect of the record or of its experience upon which it bases any
novel order." 4  A detailed presentation demonstrates careful considera-
tion of the facts and challenges a court of appeals to engage in a correspond-
ingly intense analysis before overturning the Board order. In the absence
of diligently drawn orders, the Board's broad justification that the order
"effectuates the policies of the Act" -11 may be checkmated by a court's
curt conclusion that the order is "punitive rather than remedial." 116
II. SUGGESTED ORDERS FOR CURRENT PROBLETm AREAS
A. Discharge of Workers During an Organization Campaign
When an employer discharges workers to discourage organization, the
NLRB typically orders reinstatement with back pay and cessation of further
discouragement of union activity.117 The standard order's concentration
on the harm to the discharged worker may subordinate the broader NLRA
policy of protecting the right to organize.118
113 See Fuchs, supra note 74, at 11.
13.4 Cf. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better
Definition of Standards, 75 HAv. L. REv. 863, 877-78 (1962) ; SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
15 See Burnup & Sims, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 766, 773 (1962); Hamilton Plastic
Molding Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 317, 374 (1962), modified, 312 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963) ;
cf. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 398-401 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
116 See generally text accompanying notes 203-12 infra.
117 See, e.g., Bridgeport Brass Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1961) ; Edwards Truck-
ing Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 385, 387-88 (1960). Recently the Board added to the back
pay liability 6% interest from the date on which pay would have been earned. Inter-
national Bhd. of Operative Potters v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (1962), 51 L.R.R.M. 1122
(1962). The NLRB no longer tolls back pay for the period between a trial exami-
ner's decision that a discharge was nondiscriminatory and the NLRB's reversal of
that decision. NLRB v. A. P. W. Prods. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 25, 29 (1962), modified,
316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963).
118NLRA § 1, 49 Stat 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958). The
back pay award has been described as a license fee for union busting. See PuclsKI
REPORT 2; McCulloch, Address by Chairman McCulloch, Federal Bar Association
Convention, in 30 U.S.L. WEzic 2133 (Sept. 19, 1961).
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The standard order adequately copes with most discriminatory dis-
charges occurring after the union has achieved majority status.""' How-
ever, if the employer discharges members of a union not yet representing
a majority, the standard order ignores both the time the union has lost until
the date of NLRB decision 120 and the additional time needed to restore
the organization drive's momentum.12 ' Furthermore, the employer, by
discharging key union supporters during an organization drive, gains a
tactical advantage that reinstatement alone does not restore. The em-
barrassment at being dismissed while urging fellow workers to stand up
to the employer, substantial employee turnover since the discharge, and
loss of daily contact with other workers may hinder the reinstated workers
from regaining their former influence.
Rather than merely order reinstatement and future compliance with
the NLRA, the Board should also counteract the impediments to renewed
organizational activity. For example, it might compel the employer to
allow a regulated number of union speeches on company time and a regu-
lated amount of solicitation on company property until, in the Board's
opinion, the workers have had adequate opportunity to decide whether they
desire unionization. To reduce the danger that an accelerated campaign
will sweep the workers to an irrational decision, the Board might require
both union and employer to file with the Regional Director all brochures,
movies, and other propaganda materials used in the campaign. During this
period, the Board might also have a representative of the Regional Director,
whose presence would be a moderating influence, make frequent visits to
the plant. A requirement that the workers vote in a Board-conducted
election, rather than merely sign union membership cards, would further
ensure dispassionate choice. Although this order would not restore the
months of union inactivity caused by the employer's illegal conduct, it would
119 If the employer also refuses to recognize a majority union, the Board will
order collective bargaining, Biltwell Trailer Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 606-08 (1958), even
if the union lacks majority status at the time of the Board's decision, since the
employer's unfair practice might prevent a free election. E. V. Prentice Machine
Works, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 417 (1958). This order to bargain, however, does not
account for the period of union representation lost between the refusal to bargain
and the issuance of the order. See notes 152-53 infra and accompanying text.
120 In Kendall Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 502 (1960), the Board's order came two and a
half years after the commencement of union activity, and two years after the dis-
charges.
'21 In Kendall Co., supra note 120, an unorganized plant employed 195 workers
in a town of 639. Ten workers strated an organization drive in November 1957,
holding meetings in secret lest the employer retaliate. The leading organizers were
discharged in February 1958. Any organizational momentum in what would have
been a difficult campaign was destroyed by the discharges.
Use of section 10(j) injunctions, see note 3, mipra, would immediately terminate
the repressive effects of these allegedly discriminatory discharges. When district
courts consider the General Counsel's injunction petitions, they should carefully bal-
ance the Board's inability, after a lapse of time, to restore the situation antedating
the discharge against the small cost to the employer of reinstating a few workers.
Nevertheless, courts have granted few injunctions ordering immediate reinstatement.
See, e.g., Johnston v. Wellington Mfg. Div., 49 L.R.R.M. 2536, 2538 (W.D.S.C.
1961); Brown v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 104 F. Supp. 685, 691 (N.D.
Cal. 1951). But see Elliott v. DuBois Chems., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Tex. 1962).
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enable the workers to decide on representation after a shorter period than
is ordinarily required for a successful organization campaign. If the
workers accept organization, the employer will lose the advantage of addi-
tional months in an unorganized plant; if the workers decide against
organization, the union can still appeal to them through the usual devices.
Should the Board find that a majority of workers would have joined
the union but for the employer's illegal discharges and that lingering effects
of the employer's misconduct will complicate the recapture of prior organ-
izational momentum, it might forego even an accelerated campaign and
require the employer to recognize the union as bargaining agent for a
reasonable time.122 This order necessarily rests on speculative inferences
from factors like the number of membership cards received by the union,
the rate at which workers were joining the union, and correlation of the
intensity of employer misconduct with the union growth rate.'1  More-
over, the order seemingly contravenes the statutory requirement that the
representative of employees have majority support.1 4  The justification for
this mandatory recognition, however, parallels that influencing the Board
to compel an employer to bargain with a union that has lost majority status
because of the employer's coercive activities. 2 5 The union represents a
present majority in neither case due to the employer's frustration of organ-
izational activity, which has had a continuing effect on employee morale.'2 6
To require the union to regain the majority it would have enjoyed without
employer interference permits the employer to profit from its unfair
practice.12 7 Under mandatory recognition, however, the workers can eval-
uate the organization in practice. Subsequently they may continue union
representation or petition the Board for an election to determine the
union's future status.12
8
B. Good Faith Bargaining
Success in preventing industrial strife through collective bargaining
depends on enforcement of the statutory obligation to bargain in good
1 2 Cf. Address by Chairman McCulloch, supra note 118, at 2133-34.
12 The facts in Bridgeport Brass Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1961), could support
an inference that the union would have gained a majority but for the employer's
conduct. At various times the union received membership cards from 51 of 101
employees. Id. at 1336. The membership cards alone do not support an inference
of majority status due to a possible good faith doubt about their accuracy. See A. L.
Gilbert Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2067, 2069 (1954). But immediately prior to the repre-
sentation election the employer threatened to move the plant, promised economic
benefit to the workers if the union lost the election, threatened and interrogated
the workers, attempted to enlist a spy to attend union meetings, and discharged the
most active proponent of the union. Bridgeport Brass Co., supra at 1341, 1342, 1345.
The union lost the election by a 60-40 vote. Id. at 1336 n.1.
124 NLRA § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
125 See NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107 (1955); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co.,
314 U.S. 512 (1942) (per curiam).
126 Cf. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944).
127 Ibid.
128 Cf. NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107, 111 n.1 (1955).
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faith . 29  Because of practical difficulties in applying a "good faith" stand-
ard,130 courts have defined the concept in negative terms: bad faith denotes
"a desire not to reach an agreement." 131 The NLRB finds indications of
bad faith in practices like refusal to maintain existing working conditions,"1
2
refusal to accept routine contract provisions,' procrastination,"3 shift of
position when agreement is near,' 35 unilateral changes in employment pro-
visions during negotiations,'36 refusal to make counterproposals, 1 7 and
refusal to furnish information on wages and hours. 3 8 However, since
none of these practices is conclusive, the NLRB must find "subjective bad
faith" in the circumstances as a whole. 1 9 The subjectivity of this finding
makes it the easiest mandate of the NLRA to evade, since an NLRB deter-
mination of bad faith turns on elusive factors that a reviewing court may
find inconclusive.
The Board's standard order in bad faith cases further complicates en-
forcement. If the guilty party refused to bargain on a mandatory subject,
but otherwise seemed willing to reach agreement, the usual order that he
bargain on the particular subject 140 is probably sufficient. But when the
party has shown a general unwillingness to agree on any subject, the typical
12 LMRA §§8(a) (5), 8(b)(3), 8(d), 61 Stat. 141, 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a) (5), 158(b) (3), 158(d) (1958), amending 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
130 See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960). Cf.
White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958). The obligation to bargain in good
faith does not compel agreement on substantive terms, see 79 CONG. Ruc. 9711 (1935)
(remarks of Representative Walsh) ; 79 CONG. REc. 9709 (1935) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Wood), but it does compel more than attendance at meetings. See Bethle-
hem Shipbuilding Corp., 11 N.L.R.B. 105, 146 (1939), enforced, 114 F.2d 930 (1st
Cir. 1940) ; Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 10, 21 (1937) ; Fleming, The Obligation
To Bargain in Good Faith, 16 Sw. L.J. 43, 44 (1962) ; Smith, The Evolution of the
"Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MicH. L. REv. 1065, 1086 (1941).
11 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953). See Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 1401, 1417 (1958) ; 109 U. PA. L. REv. 134, 135 (1960).
13 2 Cathey Lumber Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 157, 167 (1949).
13 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953).
1"4 NLRB v. Cummer-Graham Co., 279 F.2d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1960) (dictum).
135 NLRB v. Nesen, 211 F.2d 559, 563 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820
(1954); Newberry Mills, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 52 L.R.R.M. 1488 (1963);
Cabinet Mfg. Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 52 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1963).
136 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 219 (1949).
137 NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Cin-
cinnati Cordage & Paper Co., 141 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 52 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1963); J. H.
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 470, 474 (1949).
138 NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956) (per curiam) ; NLRB
v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
139 See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960);
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (dictum); NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952) ; The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 H.Av.
L. REV. 81, 187 (1960) ; Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv.
1401, 1418-19 (1958).
140 See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Clerks, 203 F.2d 165, 166 (9th Cir. 1953), reaff'd
on rehearing, 211 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1954); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d
247, 248 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) ; Fireboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 51 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1962).
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NLRB order "to bargain in good faith" 141 is too broad. If a party con-
tinues to frustrate effective bargaining even after a court has sustained the
unfair practice finding and enforced the standard order, the NLRB pres-
ently must argue that the party is in contempt of the court order. Even
though in its review of unfair labor practice findings a court of appeals may
defer to the Board's greater experience despite disagreement with the
result,14 when the NLRB seeks a contempt adjudication for violation of
a 10(c) order, the court must independently find willful disobedience of the
order, with the NLRB bearing the burden of proof.14 Because the stand-
ard order imposes only a general good faith obligation, to establish contempt
the Board must prove that since the order's enforcement the guilty party
has again exhibited the elusive characteristics of "subjective bad faith."
Thus, although Board and court have already found the party guilty of a
refusal to bargain, the Board may be unable to convince the court, which
lacks specialized expertise, that the party's course of conduct indicates
continued bad faith.144
The NLRB can maximize compliance with the Act by formulating
orders that direct the party guilty of bad faith temporarily to perform acts
that the statute does not require of a person not guilty of bad faith.145 The
Board must not intrude into substantive terms of bargaining, but it might
complement the general good faith obligation by ordering the guilty party
to assume the burden of commencing negotiations and arranging subse-
quent meetings,146 to offer a contract he is willing to sign, to give specific
141 See, e.g., NLRB v. Lambert, 211 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1954); Mid-America
Transp. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 52 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1963); Reeves Broadcasting
& Dev. Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 52 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1963).
142The court must sustain an NLRB finding that is supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole. See NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301,
309 n.10 (1959) ; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
143 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 755, 760 (1st Cir. 1952) (pre-
ponderance of evidence) ; NLRB v. Standard Trouser Co., 162 F.2d 1012, 1014 (4th
Cir. 1947) (clear and convincing proof) ; ansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB,
137 F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir. 1943) (more than preponderance of evidence).
144 In the Corsicana Cotton Mills cases the NLRB tried three times to have an
employer cited for contempt of an order that merely paraphrased the NLRA good
faith requirement. Each time the court of appeals found that the facts did not show
subjective bad faith. NLRB v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178 F.2d 344 (5th.Cir. 1949)
(per curiam) ; 178 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1949) (per curiam) ; 179 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1950). See also NLRB v. Lambert, 250 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1958) ; NLRB v. Norfolk
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1952).
145 A general order might be preferred, since courts, suspecting the guilty party's
future actions, will be inclined to hold him in contempt on slight evidence. Cf. Smith,
supra note 130, at 1092-93. Experience, however, has disproved this theory. See
note 144 supra. Yet the general obligation to bargain in good faith should be retained
in specific orders to prevent the guilty party from evading his statutory duty by
literal compliance with only the specific requirements of the order.
146 Before the LMRA was passed, the Supreme Court held that an employer had
no duty to seek negotiations with a union. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamp-
ing Co., 306 U.S. 292, 297 (1939). But the Court reasoned that since under the
NLRA only the employer had the duty to bargain in good faith, the union could show
its willingness to bargain by requesting meetings. Even though unions now also have
the obligation to bargain in good faith, NLRA § 8(b) (3), added by 61 Stat. 142
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1958), the Columbian case is blindly followed today.
See, e.g., Scobell Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 267 F.2d 922, 925 (2d Cir. 1959); Wafford
Cabinet Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1407, 1408-09 (1951) ;. Semi-Steel Casting Co., 88 N.L.R.B.
609, 610 (1950).
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reasons for rejecting the other side's proposals, to make counter-
proposals, 147 to send to the bargaining meetings a representative competent
to make concessions and reach agreement, 148 or to provide stenographers at
the meetings if the nonguilty party does not object.1
49
A specific order legitimately utilizes the judiciary to enforce good faith
bargaining against a party already found guilty of a refusal to bargain.
The NLRB's expert familiarity with the parties' attitudes and actions
entitles a well-reasoned affirmative order to judicial approval. Also, a
specific order will intensify the guilty party's attempt to reach agreement
if he concludes that the burden of merely formal compliance with the
specific order outweighs any disadvantages of good faith bargaining.
Although the court may still have to decide the issue of subjective bad
faith in contempt hearings, the easier question of willful disobedience of a
detailed direction 150 prescribed by the Board will often be dispositive. The
greater likelihood of a subsequent contempt finding upon violation of a
detailed decree both increases the general deterrent effect of good faith
bargaining orders and prompts compliance in the specific case, since a
court can take effective steps to enforce its contempt decree. 151
In addition to formulating more precise orders, in cases of employer
refusal to bargain the NLRB might take into account the time lapse from
the unjustified refusal to bargain until the order is issued.152 During that
period the employer has deprived workers of effective bargaining by their
chosen representatives. The Board might order the employer to negotiate
contract benefits retroactively to the time the bargaining would have oc-
curred if the employer had accepted its statutory responsibility. This
obligation might be especially feasible for nonmonetary provisions, such
as prevention of arbitrary discharges, but might also apply to sick pay, paid
147 Apparently the failure to make counterproposals has never alone been held
a refusal to bargain in good faith. 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. f 3115.26; cf. Globe Cotton
Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939) ; Easton Publishing Co., 19 N.L.R.B.
389, 397 (1940).
148 The failure to designate competent representatives may be evidence of bad
faith. See NLRB v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 241 F.2d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1957). However,
neither party has a duty to be represented by persons competent to make an agreement.
See Great So. Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180, 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 652 (1942). One court doubted that the Board can order a party to delegate
agents competent to make an agreement. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. NLRB,
216 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1954).
149 Some unions have objected when employers seek to record bargaining ses-
sions. See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 139 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953) ; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 939, 950 (1953).
15o Cf. NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1941).
151 See NLRB v. Nesen, 211 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820
(1954); NLRB v. Israel Putnam Mills, 197 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1952) (per curiam).
152 Immediate suit for a section 10(j) temporary injunction would alleviate this
problem. See Madden v. Alberto Culver Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 2516 (N.D. Ill. 1961), in
which the court ordered the employer to recognize the union, meet with it at reasonable
times, negotiate on all mandatory subjects, cease demanding oppressive concessions,
cease making unilateral changes, and cease bargaining in bad faith in any other
manner. Id. at 2518. See also Fusco v. Richard W. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp.
465 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
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vacations, and perhaps even wage increases. 153 Although the Board might
determine that retroactive bargaining would unduly complicate negotiations,
the order more fully deprives the employer of advantages from refusing
to bargain.
C. Plant Shutdowns
Courts generally hesitate to sustain Board findings that discriminatory
motives underlie plant shutdowns'1 4 Some courts have even concluded
that an employer can consider unionization as an economic factor justify-
ing a shutdown without allowing the union an opportunity to conform its
demands to the company's financial ability.155 This judicial tendency may
have induced mild 10(c) orders by the Board,156 but if discriminatory shut-
downs are not suppressed, employers not intending to close can intimidate
workers by recounting examples of unchecked discriminatory shutdowns.1
5
T
When a company that has discriminatorily discharged workers ceases
business for economic reasons prior to an NLRB decision on the discharge,
the Board properly has ordered pay to the discharged workers only until the
date of dosing, 58 since employment would have ceased then even without
the unfair practice. But if a company that owned a single plant permanently
ceased operations to avoid negotiating with a union, until recently the
Board issued a formalistic order that ended the employer's pay liability
with the discriminatory closing and required reinstatement only if the
employer returned to business.' 59 This former Board practice gave em-
ployers a means, admittedly drastic, of subverting unionization. More
importantly the workers' knowledge that the employer could shut down
without liability if they joined a union discouraged organizational activity.
in Darlington Mfg. Co.,160 however, the Board announced that the cessa-
tion of all operations for discriminatory reasons would obligate an employer
to pay its employees until they obtain substantially equivalent employ-
153 The workers' benefit from retroactive wage increases might be minimal, how-
ever, since an employer may be able to afford only a given sum for wage increases
regardless of whether wages are computed retroactively or for the future only.
154 See, e.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1961);
Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F2d 365, 369-71 (4th Cir. 1954).
155 See, e.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., supra note 154, at 172; NLRB v.
Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960) (per curiam), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909
(1961).
156 For criticism of the NLRB's standard order in this situation see Farber,
Reversion to Individualism: The Back-Pay Doctrines of the NLRB, 7 IND. & LAB.
RxL. REV. 262, 268 (1954); 7 Vnr.. L. REv. 450, 467 (1962). See also Note, 50
CoLumT. L. REV. 1123, 1129-30 (1950).
157An employer cited to a worker the shutdown of the Darlington Mill, infra
note 160, in J. P. Stevens & Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1362 (1959). See also 111 U.
PA. L. REv. 672, 674 (1963).
158 See A. M. Andrews Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 626, 630 (1955), enforced, 236 F.2d
44 (9th Cir. 1956).
159 See, e.g., Barbers Iron Foundry, 126 N.L.R.B. 30 (1960) ; Colonial Fashions,
Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1204 (1954).
160 139 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 51 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1962).
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ment.161 Although the Board can neither restore jobs nor protect organ-
izational activity after the employer leaves business unless it orders resump-
tion of operations,'1 62 the Darlington order deters shutdowns until employers
have heard the union's demands and assures workers that a decision to
unionize will not by itself result in unemployment and hardship.1' a
The most devious discriminatory shutdown occurs when a company
closes one plant and shifts operations to a distant area.' 1 4 Usually the
NLRB orders the employer either to reopen the old plant or to offer the
discharged workers jobs at the new plant,165 although it may merely
require placement of their names on a preferential hiring list to avoid
displacing other workers when the employer only continues other existing
operations. 6 Under the standard order the employer must also pay
workers from the discharge date until a reinstatement offer or placement on
a preferential hiring list 167 and, if reinstatement requires relocation, finance
moving expenses. When the Board issues this standard order, it disregards
whether the discharged workers are likely to accept relocation. 168  The
employer even may escape pay liability if immediately after the decision
to move it offers employment with knowledge that few workers will
accept. 69 The standard order thus leaves the discharged workers uncom-
361 On the facts of Darlington the Board, finding the company part of a larger
enterprise, held liable the entity that remained in business. In a later case, Star
Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 52 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1963), the Board applied the
Darlington rationale to an employer that had ceased all business operations.
162 The expense and inconvenience to an employer forced by a temporary section
10(j) injunction to continue operations until final Board decision may also influence
district courts to refuse injunctions except in the clearest cases. See Phillips v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Ga. 1961) (injunction denied).
163 See generally 111 U. PA. L. REv. 672 (1963).
164 When a company moves to a location within the same area, a Board order
to hire the discharged workers at the new plant with back pay and to recognize the
union seems satisfactory. See New England Web, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 1019, enforce-
ment denied, 309 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1962) ; cf. California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B.
765 (1955), modified, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
165 See, e.g., Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1220 (1948) ; Schieber Millinery
Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, 967-68 (1940) (memorandum decision), modified by consent,
116 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940) ; 53 MIcH. L. REv. 627, 628 (1955).
'6 6 In the case of a shutdown and removal to a new location, the NLRB orders
reinstatement even if innocent workers hired at the new plant must be discharged.
See Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 554 (1961), enforced, 305 F.2d 825 (3d
Cir. 1962) (per curiam) ; Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948). If, after a
shutdown, the employer only operates the remaining plants, the Board is reluctant
to order the discharge of workers employed in these plants to accommodate the dis-
criminatees. Although in NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 1952), the
Board ordered discharge of workers hired in other plants after the discriminatory
shutdown, if necessary to accommodate the discriminatees, in Darlington Mfg. Co.,
139 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 51 L.R.R.M. 1278, 1286 (1962), the Board did not require any
discharges in other plants. In both cases, however, the Board ordered that all dis-
criminatees not accommodated be placed on a preferential hiring list
167 See Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1962), 51 L.R.R.M. 1278,
1284 n.44 (1962).
168 See Farber, supra note 156, at 268. Cf. Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119
N.L.R.B. 162, 173-74 (1957), enforced, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).




pensated unless they accept reinstatement at a distant plant and permits the
employer to keep the new plant unorganized.1 70
Due to the expense and detailed supervision necessary to compel an
employer to return to its old location, mandatory resumption of operations
is an undesirable alternative to the optional return of the standard order,'
1 71
but the Board can do more than its current order does to rectify unlawful
plant removal. When the Board ends pay liability with placement on a
preferential hiring list or with a reinstatement offer, substantial hardship
remains with the innocent workers who do not relocate. A more appro-
priate order would continue the employer's pay liability for all workers
declining the offer to relocate until they find substantially equivalent em-
ployment. Initially the workers' only obligation should be to use reasonable
efforts to obtain similar employment in the vicinity of the original plant.
172
The Board might, however, oblige the workers to mitigate the employer's
liability by accepting less remunerative jobs in the area, if they cannot find
equivalent employment within a reasonable time.7h If the workers do not
qualify for available jobs, the Board should encourage the employer to
finance their retraining to avoid prolonged pay liability. The Board would
retain the right to alter or end the employer's liability when convinced that
changed economic conditions would have caused layoffs or a cessation of
operations. 7 4
Even if most of the workers will relocate to accept employment, the
Board should not rely solely on reinstatement and travel expenses to correct
the unfair practice when the employer opens a new plant, since these
devices compensate the individual workers without neutralizing the em-
ployer's attainment of its primary illegal objective: retention of an unor-
ganized plant. Therefore, if the relocated union members are not a majority
in the new plant, the Board should allow either their union, or any other
union with substantial support, temporarily to seek members by methods
the employer need not ordinarily tolerate, for example, by making speeches
on company time or soliciting members on company property.
170 See Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1374-75 (1954)
(Member Murdock dissenting), enforcement denied per curiam, 226 F.2d 743 (6th
Cir. 1955).
17 But cf. Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y.S. 898 (Sup.
Ct. 1936). In United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509,
510 (E.D. Pa. 1960), modified, 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962), the district court refused
to order a company that had violated a collective bargaining agreement by changing
location to move back to the old location. The court awarded punitive damages for
the breach of contract, an alternative unavailable to the NLRB in unfair practice
cases, but was reversed.
Some courts doubt the Board's power to order an employer to return without
giving him the option to offer employment at the new plant. See NLRB v. Brown-
Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17, 19 (10th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Missouri Transit Co., 250
F.2d 261, 264-65 (8th Cir. 1957).
172 See Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 332, 344-45 (1958) (trial ex-
aminer's report); cf. American Bottling Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1303, 1306 (1956).
173 Cf. NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957).
174 Cf. Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 332, 333 (1958).
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III. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW OF NLRB ORDERS
A. The Need for Judicial Cooperation
Unless the NLRB secures the cooperation of the reviewing courts,1
75
its efforts to adapt orders to varying factual situations will fail.176 Realiza-
tion of the Act's objectives often demands that a guilty party rectify his
unfair practice by undertaking inconvenient or expensive action. Courts
of appeals, however, may unwittingly apply an unduly rigorous standard
when they review these unfair practice findings to mitigate exacting
orders.' 77 This tendency has often neutralized orders that an employer
resume production or services, currently purchased from other companies,
that the Board has found it would not have discontinued if its own workers
had remained unorganized. Thus, perhaps to avoid judging the aptness
of the order, some courts repeatedly reverse findings that an employer
closed a department and subcontracted work to destroy the appropriateness
of a bargaining unit or otherwise to avoid dealing with a union.178
More frequently, however, affirmative orders have fallen because of the
courts' restrictive view of the Board's 10(c) power. In J. J. Hagerty,
Inc.,179 the NLRB framed a detailed order to cope with a union hiring hall
which had repeatedly discriminated against certain workers. However,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to enforce that portion
of the order which required the union to establish a nondiscriminatory
referral system under the supervision of the Regional Director. 80 Al-
though the Board only compelled the union to formulate an approved plan
which would control any hiring hall it might operate, the court miscon-
strued the order as requiring the union to operate a hall. The court's main
objection, however, was that the Board had interjected itself into the pro-
175 Board orders come before the courts of appeals whenever the Board seeks
enforcement of a decision or a party petitions for review. NLRA § 10(e) -(f), 49
Stat. 454-55 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1958).
17 6 Cf. NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107, 112 (1955).
177 The Supreme Court rejected the announced practice of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit to apply a stricter standard in reviewing the underlying unfair
practice finding in cases involving reinstatement with pay than those involving no
monetary liability. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962) (per curiam).
178 See Marathon-Clark Co-op. Dairy Ass'n v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 269, 272 (7th
Cir. 1963) ; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. NLRB, 311 F.2d 19, 22 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Jays Foods,
Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Kingsford, 313 F.2d 826 (6th
Cir. 1963) ; NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961) ; NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1959);
NLRB v. Drennon Food Prods. Co., 272 F.2d 23, 27-28 (5th Cir. 1959); NLRB v.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848, 855 (5th Cir. 1954). But see NLRB
v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc.,
298 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17, 19 (10th
Cir. 1961). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly disapproved the
order in NLRB v. Major, 296 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1961), when it upheld the finding
of discrimination but refused to enforce the order.
'79 139 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 51 L.R.R.M. 1349 (1962), modified, 47 CCH LAB. CAs.
18352 (2d Cir. 1963). See text accompanying notes 110-12 supra.
180 Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 47 CCH LAB. CAs.
1118352 (2d Cir. 1963).
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cedures by which the union and employers established referral systems.
This objection would be valid if the NLRB issued a Hagerty-type order
in every discriminatory hiring hall case, but the court failed to appreciate
that the history of this particular hall demonstrated the need for a tem-
porarily supervised course of conduct.
In Coats & Clark, Inc.,181 an employer had continually harassed a
union organizer who eventually left her employment. The NLRB deter-
mined that the immediate cause of her resignation was anger at the inferior
condition of the machine she operated, but that the employer's past dis-
crimination against her added indirectly to her frustration. Balancing the
policies involved, the NLRB did not award back pay, but, to eliminate the
consequences of the employer's coercion, the Board ordered reinstate-
ment.)8 2  Unfortunately, the reviewing court relied on easily distinguish-
able cases 183 to invalidate the NLRB's well-reasoned order without ex-
amining its appropriateness in the actual case.
B. Current Standards of Review for NLRB Orders
1. The Statutory Standard for Findings of Fact
The NLRA provides that "the findings of the Board with respect to
questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record con-
sidered as a whole shall be conclusive." 184 Courts may paraphrase this
standard when reviewing NLRB orders and uphold them only when they
have adequate support in the record.' 8 5 However, the statutory standard
unduly limits NLRB orders, since it applies to findings of fact supporting
unfair labor practice charges 186 rather than to section 10(c) orders, whose
primary source is the expertise developed from the NLRB's accumulated
experience. 18 7 Although courts have variously concluded that the NLRB's
choice of an appropriate 10(c) order involves questions of fact,'88 inferences
181113 N.L.R.B. 237 (1955), modified, 241 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1957).
182 113 N.L.R.B at 238-39 (1955).
183 241 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1957). In NLRB v. Scullin Steel Co., 161 F.2d
143, 150-51 (8th Cir. 1947), the discharge itself was allegedly discriminatory, and
when it was held nondiscriminatory, reinstatement became unnecessary. In Texar-
kana Bus Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 480, 485 (8th Cir. 1941), reinstatement effectuated
no policy of the Act since the individual quit for personal reasons only.
184 NLRA § 10(e), added by 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958).
185 See NLRB v. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 267 F. 2d 418, 421
(5th Cir. 1959).
186 Courts reviewing unfair labor practice findings generally limit the Board to
the facts before it. See the criticism of per se rules in Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S.
395, 409 (1952). See also NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956)
(dictum). However, even in review of unfair labor practice findings, courts should
allow for Board experience. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 49
(1954).
187 See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953).
188 See Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 1942).
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of fact,'8 9 and special NLRB competence, 190 every order derives not only
from the Board's findings in the record as to the parties' past activities,
191
but also from the Board's expert estimation of their future conduct and of
the relative success of various orders in analogous situations.
192
2. Overemphasis of the Board's Expertise
In contrast to standards unnecessarily restricting the NLRB, others
emasculate the function of judicial review. One standard requires enforce-
ment of a 10(c) order unless it is "a patent attempt to achieve ends other
than those . . . effectuat[ing] the policies of the Act." 193 Another,
based on Supreme Court dictum,19 4 denies enforcement of 10(c) orders
only if they are "not calculated to effectuate a policy of the Act." 1'5 Both
standards connote intent, but the NLRB would probably never intend an
order to disserve the ends of the Act. Although the courts that use these
standards may not limit reversal to deliberate malfeasance by the Board,
the standard encourages judicial passivity that will be aroused only by an
outrageously distorted NLRB order.
3. Comparison With Courts of Equity
Even though some courts have upheld NLRB orders "only if the relief
sought is consistent with the principles of equity," 196 the Supreme Court
has declared that the NLRB is not confined by equitable principles.
19 7
Whereas equity developed with knowledge that denial of equity jurisdiction
would not preclude legal relief, 198 in unfair labor practice cases the NLRB
is the final source of relief. Moreover, equity courts prefer to order the
189 See H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 522 (1941) ; NLRB v. Bradford
Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 343-44 n.9 (1940).
190 See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-49 (1953); Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940); NLRB v. Stow
Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 905 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Ad-
ininistrative Action, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 559, 582-83 (1950); cf. General Protective
Comm. v. SEC, 346 U.S. 521, 534 (1954).
191 See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953).
192 In Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961), the
Supreme Court's decision to remand an NLRB order that a union reimburse dues to
rectify a discriminatory hiring hall reads as if the Court were reviewing an unfair
practice finding, rather than a 10(c) order dealing with an unquestioned violation of
the Act. Although the Court probably reached the right result, it demanded proof
that membership in the union was influenced or compelled by the unfair practice just
as it might demand proof of an employer's failure to bargain in good faith. See id.
at 655-56. The question before the Court should have been how the order served
or disserved the public ends of the Act, and not merely whether it gave benefits to
undeserving parties.
193 Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
19 NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953).
'95 NLRB v. General Drivers, 264 F.2d 21, 23 (10th Cir. 1959).
196NLRB v. American Dredging Co., 276 F.2d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 914, 918
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961) ; NLRB v. Kingston Cake Co., 206
F.2d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 1953) ; NLRB v. National Biscuit Co., 185 F.2d 123, 124 (3d
Cir. 1950) (per curiam).
197 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941).
198 Cf. KEnToN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQurry 120 (4th ed. 1956).
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cessation of unlawful conduct rather than affirmative performance,199
especially when compliance must be measured against a subjective stand-
ard.20 0  Yet, the NLRB constantly orders parties to undertake extensive
activity and requires both subjective 201 and objective compliance with its
orders. The application of equitable standards to NLRB orders ignores
Congress' decision to place the administration of the NLRA in this agency
in order to avoid the traditional restrictions on equity courts.202
4. Use of Labels
Courts persistently substitute labels for rigorous analysis 203 or append
them to otherwise instructive decisions, perhaps misleading subsequent
courts. 20 4  Courts state a conclusion rather than a guide when they deter-
mine that an order has "no sound basis," 205 goes "too far," 206 is "appro-
priate," 207 "oppressive," 208 "arbitrary," 209 or "punitive." 210 One court
apparently intended emphatic guidance when it cumulated synonyms by
labelling an order "punitive, penal, non-remedial and . . . unauthor-
ized." 211 These labels do not enhance analysis 212 since, for example, every
order requiring inconvenience or expense punishes the guilty party and
remedies, even if ineptly, the unfair practice.
C. The Proper Scope of Review
Congress contemplated that the courts of appeals would not defer to
NLRB expertise without critical review,213 but the NLRB exercises
199 See, Elliott, Specific Performance, 1960 U. lIL. L.F. 72, 74; Pound, The
Progress of the Law, 1918-1919: Equity, 33 HARv. L. REv. 420, 435 (1920).
200 See FuLLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 29 (1947).
201See discussion of good faith bargaining, notes 129-51 upra.
202 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
203 See, e.g., Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 646, 647
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam), modified, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1957).
204 See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 63, 76 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 910 (1961) ; Local 282, Bldg. Material Teamsters v. NLRB, 275
F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1960).
205 NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F. 2d 403, 409 (2d Cir. 1958).
2 0 6 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 646, 647 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (per curiam), modified, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
207 NLRB v. American Dredging Co., 276 F.2d 286, 287 (3d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961).
208 Local 282, Bldg. Material Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir.
1960), quoting NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
209 Morrison-Knudson Co. v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 914, 918 (2d Cir. 1960).
210 Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961);
NLRB v. Local 85, Sheet Metal Workers, 274 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961).
211 Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 63, 76 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 910 (1961).
212 See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953); Note, 89
U. PA. L. REv. 648, 655 (1941).
213 See note 71 supra. See also Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence
on the Whole Record," 64 HRv. L. REv. 1233, 1249 (1951).
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primary responsibility for section 10(c) orders.2 14  Thus, despite the strict
standard of proof a court requires to affirm an unfair practice finding,21
the court should cede to the Board wide discretion to order guilty parties
to take affirmative action,216 so long as the Board recognizes the unique
facts before it and explains the considerations that shaped the order.
Once a court is aware of the distinctive problems raised by 10(c)
orders, elaborate standards of review are not necessary. Whenever a court
disagrees with an NLRB order, it should precisely explain its reasons both
to ensure that its disagreement has a rational basis and to guide the Board
in subsequent orders. Proper judicial skepticism requires articulated
justification by the Board, but the courts should avoid foreclosing NLRB
experimentation attempting better to effectuate the Act.217 The attitude of
the courts will reflect the respect the NLRB has earned 218 by its reasoned
treatment of cases and the clarity of its orders.219  However, the reasonable
review of 10(c) orders must ultimately rely on judicial honesty and re-
straint 220 in this emotionally charged area.
IV. CONCLUSION
The detection of unfair practices means little if the only sanction is
social embarrassment. 22 1 The NLRB's challenge is not only the detection
and proof of unfair labor practices but also the next step in the process-
formation of specific, yet flexible, orders that give coordinated effect to
the Act.
Dennis M. Flannery
214 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87, 96
(1957); NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600 (1941); NLRB v. Seven-Up
Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953) ; Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators,
Judges, and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARv. L. Rxv. 70, 100 (1944).
215 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
216 See Dixie Bedding Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 268 F.2d 901, 907 (5th Cir. 1959).
217 For an example of judicial enforcement of an unusual NLRB order, see NLRB
v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 213 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1954). The Board had
ordered reinstatement of discharged supervisors, who are not protected by the Act,
because their discharge had coerced protected employees.
218 See Blinn, Judicial Review of NLRB Orders: The Role of Inarticulate Policy
Considerations, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 421, 428 (1952).
219 See text accompanying notes 113-16 supra.
220 Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). Since the
various administrative agencies deal in matters of differing complexity, courts may
ignore administrative expertise in review of areas in which they feel as competent as
the agency. Cf. Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44
A.B.A.J. 945, 948-49 n.11 (1958). This tendency may explain why the Courts of
Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits sustain the
NLRB more often than the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. See
id. at 948 n.10.
221 Cf. Pennsylvania R.K_ Sys. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203, 217 (1925);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Board, 261 U.S. 72, 79 (1923) ; text accom-
panying notes 59-61 supra.
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